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INTRODUCTION
In recent years, scholars, commentators, former tech company founders, and political leaders have made the case for breaking up and regulating big tech companies like Alphabet (the parent 
company of Google), Facebook, and Amazon. The proposals to break up 
and regulate big tech companies are specific: Unwind mergers, require 
tech platforms to separate from businesses that operate on the platform, 
regulate platforms with nondiscrimination principles drawn from public 
utilities and public accommodations laws, and adopt privacy regulations.1 
Advocates for breaking up and regulating big tech hold that these compa-
nies have become a danger to the economy, society, and democracy.2
Opponents of breaking up and regulating big tech have put forward 
a variety of responses, but among them is the assertion that breaking up 
big tech is problematic in an era of resurgent great power competition, 
particularly between the United States and China.3 This argument takes 
different forms. Some commentators have argued that the United States 
and China are in a Cold War-style arms race over artificial intelligence 
(AI); big tech, they argue, is needed to win that contest.4 Alphabet’s for-
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mer chief, Eric Schmidt, has thus highlighted U.S.-Chinese competition 
for technology in response to arguments that tech should be broken up.5  
A second argument is that if big American tech companies are broken up 
and regulated, one consequence will be that the big Chinese tech com-
panies will become dominant globally. Facebook’s Mark Zuckerberg and 
Sheryl Sandberg have taken this position, with Zuckerberg noting that 
the Chinese companies “do not share the values that we have.”6 Even 
Congressman Ro Khanna and Senator Mark Warner, who have both been 
critical of big tech companies, have expressed concerns along these lines, 
namechecking Alibaba, Baidu, and Tencent as potential global power-
houses.7
The claim that breaking up and regulating big tech might have 
consequences for great power competition deserves to be taken seriously. 
The problem is that upon serious consideration, the national security 
case against breaking up and regulating big tech is not just weak—it is 
backwards. Far from being a threat to the United States, breaking up and 
regulating big tech are necessary to preserve America’s competitiveness, 
national defense, and democratic freedoms in an era of great power 
competition. 
First, big tech companies are not competing with China in some 
kind of new Cold War arms race; rather, many are integrated with China, 
seeking to expand further into China, and cooperating with Chinese 
companies and (by extension) likely with the Chinese government. Big 
tech’s integration with China thus supports the rise and export of digital 
authoritarianism; deepens economic dependence that can be used as 
leverage against the United States in future geopolitical moments; forces 
companies to self-censor and contort their preferences to serve Chinese 
censors and officials; and makes profit-seeking corporations and their 
lobbyists less trustworthy in advocating for the interests of the United 
States in Washington, D.C. Second, in an era of great power competition, 
innovation and a strong defense industrial base are essential. But relying 
on a small number of big tech companies (and, in particular, failing to 
enforce antitrust laws and regulate the sector) means less competition—
and that in turn means less innovation, particularly when compared with 
a system of robust competition and public investment in research and 
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development. Concentration in the tech sector also weakens the defense 
industrial base by making the government dependent on a small number 
of contractors and redirecting taxpayer dollars from research to monop-
oly profits. Taking into account all of these dynamics, national security 
arguments do not favor protecting big tech companies from competition 
and regulation. American national security would be strengthened by 
breaking up and regulating big tech companies.  
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BIG TECH, GLOBAL ENTANGLEMENTS, AND 
GREAT POWER COMPETITION
At a time of resurgent great power competition, claims that big tech companies are assisting that competition are super-ficially appealing, but they largely do not hold up to scrutiny. 
Many of the biggest tech companies are global players, operating in 
China, working with that government (knowingly or unknowingly), and 
seeking to expand their footprint. This not only means that their work 
abroad assists technological development in China but also that the 
Chinese government has increased leverage over those companies and 
the United States. Breaking up these companies would create a domestic 
technological ecosystem in which a more significant part of the market-
place is not dependent on Chinese markets, thereby making the United 
States more resilient.
How Big Tech Helps Strengthen China 
The claim that big American tech companies are somehow an alternative 
to Chinese dominance—or, in the more extreme form, that they are 
9THE TECH GIANTS, MONOPOLY POWER, AND PUBLIC DISCOURSE
competing with China on behalf of the United States—is largely 
backwards. In fact, many big American tech companies are operating in 
China, working with Chinese companies, and seeking to expand. Because 
markets and the state are intertwined in China, interactions with Chinese 
companies and investments in China are likely to pass along operational 
and technological developments to the Chinese government and military, 
including in ways that advance its emerging surveillance state—and 
accelerate its ability to spread its model of digital authoritarianism 
around the world. In short, big tech companies that operate in China are 
likely assisting the rise of China, not acting as a hedge against it. 
Rather than competing with China, many big tech companies are 
integrating with China or attempting to deepen their integration with 
China.  Google has announced an AI center in Beijing,8  and it is explor-
ing a partnership with Tencent that involves using the Chinese tech 
giant’s cloud service as an alternative to Google Cloud.9 In 2018, the com-
pany also proposed Project Dragonfly, which would have created a search 
engine that would be in compliance with Chinese censorship regulations 
behind the Great Firewall.10 That endeavor created controversy within the 
firm and criticism from human rights groups.11 
Other companies also operate in China or are seeking to do so. 
Microsoft is expanding data centers in China and has built an operating 
system, “Windows 10 China Government Edition,” for the Chinese gov-
ernment.12 After Alibaba, Amazon provides the largest cloud service in 
China, and its Amazon Web Services division works with local companies 
and is expanding its data centers.13 Apple, of course, famously designs 
its phones in California but makes them in China.14 In 2017, Apple 
announced a partnership with a Chinese firm with close ties to the gov-
ernment and a year later moved its Chinese iCloud and iCloud encryption 
services to China.15 Notably, Facebook isn’t operating in China—but not 
for lack of trying. The company has repeatedly attempted to gain access 
but has been blocked by government officials.16 
Merely operating in China might not seem like it undermines the 
claim of U.S.-Chinese competition. After all, it might be that American 
companies are seeking to steal market share from Chinese companies in 
China. Global dominance requires, unsurprisingly, dominance around 
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the globe, including in the world’s biggest markets. The problem is that, 
according to scholars, U.S. government officials, and even American busi-
ness associations, any U.S. company that is developing AI in China, mak-
ing significant technological investments in China, or simply operating in 
China is likely supporting the Chinese government and military. 
Chinese companies are often state-run, partly owned by the state, 
or have informal ties to state and Communist Party officials, as scholars 
have documented.17 Formal and informal ties allow the government to 
have influence over many companies, and they create an incentive for 
companies to comply with party preferences preemptively even without 
formal government pressure.18 Cooperation and partnerships with these 
companies therefore mean cooperation with state-directed aims. “No 
major Chinese company,” Senator Mark Warner has noted, “is indepen-
dent of the Chinese government and Communist Party.”19 An official at 
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce goes even further, arguing that American 
firms going to China have “to please the Chinese government and the 
Communist Party.”20
Moreover, because artificial intelligence is a dual-use technology, 
ostensibly commercial innovations can also have military implications. 
China’s stated doctrine of “civil-military fusion” thus virtually guarantees 
that companies are indirectly assisting the military if they are working 
with Chinese entities.21 Under that doctrine, “any technologies held 
by the private or academic sectors—whether imported or developed 
in-house—must be shared with the Chinese military.”22 When combined 
with the corporate-state relationship in China, this means the techno-
logical innovations in the private sector are likely being shared with the 
government for military purposes. As former defense secretary Ash Carter 
has noted, “If you’re working in China, you don’t know whether you’re 
working on a project for the military or not.”23 
The fact that Chinese companies and the state are intertwined means 
that American companies working in China are potentially helping accel-
erate the adoption of digital authoritarianism within China and its spread 
abroad. In general, the development of artificial intelligence “offers a 
plausible way for big, economically advanced countries to make their 
citizens rich while maintaining control over them.”24 Big data, combined 
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with AI, enables governments and big tech companies not only to predict 
but also to shape what individuals will do. Politically, this means that 
governments will have the power to preempt dissenters to a far greater 
degree than authoritarian regimes of the past.25 Economically, it means 
that centralized economic planning might find greater success than in 
the past, because governments and companies can shape the behavior of 
individuals.26 And over time, behavioral changes shape beliefs, poten-
tially building support for the regime itself.27 These dynamics suggest 
that the new “digital authoritarianism” may have greater staying power 
than its low-tech precursors.28
At home, China has long been concerned about domestic disharmony 
and has pursued a policy of “social management” to achieve “holis-
tic” security—not just national security but party organization and the 
management of the social order.29 The Chinese State Council sees AI 
as “irreplaceable” in ensuring social harmony in the future.30 China has 
taken steps to develop a “social credit system,” in which individuals are 
assessed in every interaction to determine their trustworthiness, their 
compliance with laws and social norms, and the degree to which their 
social networks are also compliant. Chinese tech companies have report-
edly agreed to share data with the government in support of this proj-
ect.31 Local governments and tech companies are cooperating to develop 
“credit cities,” the local counterpart to a full-on national system.32 Chinese 
companies are also already exporting surveillance technologies abroad, 
including biometric censors and facial recognition software.33
Given that many big American tech companies are operating in 
China or seeking to do so and that engagement with Chinese entities 
likely means information is transferred to the government, the idea that 
big American tech companies are helping the United States vis-à-vis 
China in some kind of Cold War-style technology arms race makes little 
sense. It is just as likely, if not much more so, that firms operating in 
China are directly or indirectly furthering China’s emergent domestic 
surveillance capabilities, its military use of those technologies, and its 
spread of digital authoritarianism abroad as well.34
12 KNIGHT FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTE
How Big Tech’s Entanglements Threaten American 
Power and Values
In addition to benefiting Chinese power, big tech’s integration with China 
threatens the United States by creating leverage over the United States, 
and it could, in the future, undermine the American ecosystem of free 
speech and expression. This could happen in multiple ways: Integration 
opens the United States to espionage and surveillance, creates economic 
leverage over the United States, and preemptively forces companies to 
adhere to the standards of Chinese censors, thereby restricting speech 
and expression particularly on issues related to democracy. 
Most obviously, integration with China raises concerns about espi-
onage and surveillance. For example, Pentagon officials have been con-
cerned that if the Chinese company Huawei operates 5G systems among 
American allies, the United States will have to restrict intelligence sharing 
along such systems; if those systems have surveillance capacities or back-
doors, information across the system could be captured by the Chinese 
government.35 Federal regulators have also flagged a Chinese company’s 
acquisition of the dating app Grindr, which has a great deal of personal 
information that could be used to pressure or blackmail users.36 
More broadly, economic interdependence can be used as leverage 
for political purposes. Scholars refer to this by a variety of terms, includ-
ing “geoeconomics,”37 “reverse entanglement,”38 and “weaponized 
interdependence.”39 But the tactics are similar regardless of the label—
and China utilizes them frequently. To retaliate against South Korea’s 
adoption of a U.S. missile defense system, China blocked tourism to the 
country.40 And it blocked imports from Norway after dissident Liu Xiaobo 
was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize.41
Interdependence in the economy generally, and in the technology 
sector specifically, thus bring significant risks to the United States in an 
era of great power competition. The more integrated the economies of 
two countries, the more likely it is that a foreign country will have lever-
age over the United States. The use of boycotts is one example. But rais-
ing tariffs to start a trade war could devastate sectors of the economy, and 
interrupting a supply chain for essential parts and components (whether 
consumer, commercial, or military) could have significant consequences, 
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particularly in a crisis. 
Integration also means that corporations are contorting their opera-
tions outside of China in order to comply with the preferences of Chinese 
censors. The most prominent concern is self-censorship—companies and 
other actors that change their messages, artistic choices, or statements 
for fear of offending Chinese censors. For example, the general manager 
of the Houston Rockets basketball team tweeted support for the Hong 
Kong protestors, only to backtrack in the face of concerns about the 
Chinese reaction.42 The People’s Daily branded Mercedes-Benz an “enemy 
of the people” after the car manufacturer posted a quote from the Dalai 
Lama on Instagram; Mercedes later deleted the post.43 Some university 
researchers are concerned about self-censorship within academia on 
topics related to China.44 Hollywood studios are reportedly changing 
dialogue, scenes, and themes in movies in order to comply with Chinese 
censors.45 And tech companies too have taken steps toward compliance 
with Chinese internet regulations: Apple, for example, “removed VPNs 
[virtual private networks] from the Chinese version of its App Store.”46 
Google’s Project Dragonfly was controversial internally with employees 
for the same reason. 
Why does it matter if corporations change their behaviors based on 
Chinese preferences? After all, global companies have done so for many 
years. McDonald’s and Coca-Cola, for example, offer different menus and 
beverages in different countries to respond to the tastes and preferences 
of consumers. The shift in corporate behavior in response to Chinese pref-
erences differs in two ways. First, unlike the McDonald’s and Coca-Cola 
examples, companies aren’t just changing their products within China. 
They are doing so globally. That the leaders of Mercedes won’t quote the 
Dalai Lama and Hollywood writers are changing scripts for blockbuster 
films because they might offend Chinese censors means that American 
audiences are subject to the views of Chinese censors, as is the rest of the 
world. 
Second, the willingness of these companies to adhere to Chinese 
preferences calls into question whether global firms can be trusted when 
they seek to lobby or influence the U.S. government. In the mid-twentieth 
century, the maxim “what’s good for General Motors is good for America” 
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suggested a link between corporate success and national success. That 
is unlikely to be the case anymore (if it ever was). Under the dominant 
ideology of contemporary corporate lawyers—who see shareholder profits 
as the sole aim of corporate managers—corporate managers are required 
to pursue profitable operations; American national interests are not part 
of the calculus.47 A global corporation that gains most of its profits from 
abroad might therefore have profit-based interests that do not align with 
American national interests. To put a fine point on it, one could imagine 
a company that seeks to expand its access into China lobbying the United 
States government in ways that are detrimental to American interests and, 
indeed, even serve the interests of the Chinese government. This is not to 
say that corporate executives or lobbyists are foreign agents deliberately 
pursuing such an aim—or that they think of themselves that way and 
would state as much to government officials. This wolf comes in sheep’s 
clothing: Policies will likely be justified as pursuing neutral economic 
principles, and many who advocate for them might not even see the 
broader connections. 
Defenders of integration often suggest that narrowly drawn regula-
tions can address any problems that might arise from integration, though 
at least some defenders consider even limited restrictions on economic 
integration to be disastrous.48 For example, one set of think tank scholars 
have argued for requiring transparency in Chinese corporation owner-
ship (that is, to identify state-owned or -invested companies) as a way 
to prevent Chinese influence over American corporations. 49 Another 
set says that U.S. policy should consider “who owns a company’s stock, 
how the company is governed, and whether it has sizable contracts with 
the Chinese military or defense industry. ... Similarly, companies with 
executives close to the state, through either prior employers or personal 
connections, warrant further scrutiny.”50 A third argues that “the United 
States should work with its allies and trading partners to pressure Beijing 
to open up the Chinese market to foreign companies, curb its preferential 
treatment of Chinese firms, and better protect foreign companies’ intel-
lectual property.”51
If it is correct that the Chinese state and market are integrated, as 
a number of senior defense officials and scholars of the Chinese state 
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and market have argued,52 then these policy solutions cannot meet the 
nature of the challenge. Transparency rules will not solve the problem 
of informal ties between government and private sector in China, nor 
do they place mandates on companies if there are formal ties. Careful 
investigation of the relevant relationships and ownership ties might miss 
important connections, ignore the fact that Chinese doctrine requires 
civil-military fusion, and neglect to address the incentive companies 
have to comply preemptively with Chinese government preferences, even 
absent any specific connection to the government or pressure from the 
government. Finally, efforts to reduce preferential treatment and protect 
American intellectual property run counter to the fact that the integra-
tion of state and market in China is not a bug, but a central feature of the 
system. 
How Breaking Up Big Tech Builds a More Resilient 
Economy and Democracy
What does bigness have to do with integration? Or to put it differently, is 
the real problem integration with China rather than a weak antitrust and 
regulatory regime to govern big tech companies? The question of integra-
tion with China as a general matter is beyond the scope of this essay, but 
the size and dominance of American tech companies is part of the prob-
lem, and breaking up big tech should therefore be part of the solution. 
To see why, compare a concentrated ecosystem with a small num-
ber of big companies to a competitive ecosystem with a large number of 
small companies. In a concentrated ecosystem with few players, China 
will have far more leverage over the United States. A small number of big 
tech companies that are integrated with China will be more dependent on 
Chinese markets for consumers and profits—and, in turn, more vulnera-
ble to pressure from the Chinese government. In contrast, in a fractured 
market with many players, it is much more likely that some will seek 
other sources for supply chains, develop domestic American capacities, 
or simply choose not to engage in the Chinese market—whether because 
of idiosyncratic preferences, competitive dynamics, product differentia-
tion, higher costs, or other factors. 
It is theoretically possible that we might instead expect another out-
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come: A small number of tech firms making monopoly profits might not 
need Chinese markets and therefore would be more independent from 
that country’s fusion of politics and economics. Likewise, a multi-player 
ecosystem of smaller companies, each with razor-thin profit margins, 
might push all of these players to dependence on Chinese markets for 
consumers and profits (this is, of course, where debates over integration 
versus disentanglement are relevant).  But theory is not reality, and this 
alternative hypothesis has not been borne out. In our current highly 
concentrated tech market, big tech companies are not forsaking Chinese 
markets out of a combination of morality, patriotism, and monopoly prof-
its. They are operating in China and are desperate to integrate further. 
Concerns about censorship and distorted practices are also signifi-
cantly reduced in a competitive ecosystem of smaller players because 
some companies and creative gatekeepers won’t aim to comply with 
Chinese government preferences. Consider the Hollywood context. Dis-
ney’s share of box office sales domestically, for example, approaches 40 
percent, and the six biggest studios have 85 percent of box office sales.53 
These companies produce fewer films and, because of their market power, 
can contractually require that those films be shown in theaters in ways 
that block other films.54 These companies are also increasingly integrat-
ing vertically across production and distribution: Netflix both produces 
shows and operates a streaming service, as does Amazon and now even 
Disney. The result is that smaller players are likely to face a tilted play-
ing field because integrated behemoths can prioritize their own content 
over competitors and might not take chances on content that isn’t likely 
to maximize their viewership goals.55 If these big integrated companies 
comply with Chinese censors because of their ambitions in the Chinese 
market, then American consumers will not see content that doesn’t 
adhere to Chinese government preferences. In contrast, in a system with 
a large number of small studios, many would not have the size and scope 
to play to the Chinese market, let alone be dependent on the Chinese 
market. They also wouldn’t have the power and scale to preference their 
own content over competitors through vertical integration. The result 
would be an ecosystem in which Americans will have a range of content 
choices—including entertainment that might not accord with the views of 
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foreign censors. 
Big tech companies are not likely immune from what is happening in 
Hollywood—as well as what has happened to Mercedes and other entities 
that seek to operate in China. Many of these companies, like Amazon 
and Google, seek access to Chinese markets and operate as both content 
producers and distributors or platforms. To the extent that they have 
divisions whose work is objectionable to censors in foreign countries 
(Amazon, of course, creates its own content; as does YouTube, which is 
a subsidiary of Google), they too will feel pressure to preemptively shape 
that content in ways that are palatable to censors. And because of their 
market power within the United States, U.S. consumers are likely to be 
left with fewer and fewer serious scalable alternatives. 
Finally, in a competitive ecosystem with many players, concerns 
about the ill effects of lobbying are mitigated as well. In a system with 
a few dominant players, efforts to lobby the United States government 
should be seen as highly questionable because of companies’ depen-
dence on Chinese markets. A multi-player ecosystem addresses this 
challenge in two ways: First, many companies will not be dependent on 
Chinese markets. Second, in a multi-player ecosystem, differentiated 
companies are less likely to have shared interests and are more likely to 
end up on different sides of policy questions.56 This means that their lob-
bying efforts are less likely to cut in a single direction and thus less likely 
to capture government. This insight is not a new one—it is foundational 
to American political and constitutional thought. In Federalist 10, James 
Madison argued that in a political ecosystem with many groups with 
differentiated interests, no particular faction would be able to capture 
government.57 Instead, they would cancel each other out and enable 
policymakers to pursue the public good. Competition between interests, 
not the dominance of a few interests (particularly if foreign-influenced), 
preserves a free and democratic government.
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BIG TECH AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF 
AMERICAN POWER
American power is also critical in a time of great power com-petition. Here too, the case for protecting big tech and restricting competition in the tech sector is weak. Under conventional mar-
ket theory—and economic practice—competition sparks innovation. If 
the United States wants to continue to be at the forefront of technological 
innovation, then more competition is desirable, not less. Breaking up and 
regulating big tech will thus improve innovation, not reduce it. America’s 
position in a great power rivalry also depends on its defense industrial 
base—the resilience and capacity of its defense sector. But a concen-
trated defense sector means less innovation in defense, higher prices for 
taxpayers to procure defense systems, and a functional redistribution of 
taxpayer funds from R&D or other kinds of spending to profits for defense 
contractors. As technology becomes more integrated with defense, the 
same dangers of a concentrated defense industrial base could emerge 
with respect to the defense technological base. Breaking up and regulat-
ing big tech, combined with R&D funding, would likely instead create a 
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more competitive defense sector and a more innovative, more resilient, 
and cheaper one too.
Big Tech, Competitiveness, and Innovation
One of the central arguments against breaking up and regulating big tech 
on national security grounds is that big tech companies are essential 
for innovation in the tech sector and thus for American competitiveness 
and ultimately for national security. Historically, however, innovation 
has come from a mix of competition and public funding of research and 
development. Breaking up and regulating tech companies thus doesn’t 
mean ceding ground to the Chinese on technological innovation—it 
means creating a competitive marketplace with great innovative capacity. 
Whether or not they say it explicitly, those who want to protect big 
tech from antitrust and regulation support a national champions model. 
The national champions approach suggests that innovation takes place 
within big companies that are protected from competition and therefore 
have resources to spend on research and development. Some associate 
this approach with Joseph Schumpeter, who suggested that firms in com-
petitive markets might be less innovative than monopolists.58 In this vein, 
commentators celebrate how Bell Labs was able to innovate for genera-
tions and see Google X, Facebook, and other tech companies as similarly 
investing in frontier research that will ultimately lead to innovative 
breakthroughs.59
While innovation can take place under a national champions model, 
innovation does not require national champions—and there are strong 
arguments that the national champions approach is limited and even 
counterproductive. First, as Tim Wu has noted, “[B]oth history and basic 
economics suggest we do much better trusting that fierce competition 
at home yields stronger industries overall.”60 This response, of course, 
has been commonplace in basic economics for decades and in debates 
on competition is linked to the views of Kenneth Arrow.61 Market com-
petition is good for innovation because competitors have to find ways 
to differentiate themselves in order to survive and expand. In contrast, 
large protected firms get lethargic, are slow to innovate, and rest on their 
laurels. 
20 KNIGHT FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTE
Wu points out that we also have evidence—not just theory—to show 
that protecting national champions is inferior to encouraging competi-
tion. In the 1980s, Wu argues, Japan took the approach of protecting its 
national champions in the electronics industry. Powerhouses like NEC, 
Panasonic, and Toshiba had direct government support. In contrast, the 
United States took the opposite tack with IBM. The computer firm was 
brought under antitrust scrutiny, and the legal battle went on for more 
than a decade, along the way chilling Big Blue from engaging in any con-
duct that could even potentially run afoul of the antitrust laws. The result, 
Wu notes, was to create the space for a variety of hardware and software 
companies, Microsoft, Lotus, and Apple among them. Competition led to 
innovation and the creation of some of the most forward-looking compa-
nies of the era.62
Second, national champions can actually limit innovation because 
they have an incentive to avoid research and innovations that might 
jeopardize their business model or undermine their dominant position. 
Bell Labs, for example, has long been celebrated for its role as an “ideas 
factory.”63 But Bell and AT&T also suppressed innovations when they 
threatened its business model. Bell inventors, for example, developed 
recording devices in the 1930s that could have been used for answering 
machines. But AT&T’s management blocked their emergence for fear that 
they would jeopardize use of the telephone.64
An alternative approach to innovation is one that relies less on 
protectionism for national champions and more on market competition 
and on public investment in research and innovation. Competition, as 
noted already, can be a powerful motivator for innovation. When big tech 
incumbents face little competition, society forgoes the innovation ben-
efits that come from competition. Who knows if Instagram or WhatsApp 
could have dethroned Facebook’s primacy and developed even more 
new and innovative products? Facebook’s moves to acquire those firms 
prevented us from ever finding out. What small businesses might emerge 
if they didn’t have to compete with Amazon Basics on Amazon’s Market-
place? Unwinding mergers and separating platforms from companies that 
do business on the platform would help spur competition and lead to 
innovation. 
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Some might argue that robotics, AI, and quantum computing are 
so resource-intensive that an ecosystem of smaller companies engaged 
in fierce competition would mean that no company would have the 
resources available to invest in those next-generation technologies. There 
are a few responses to this argument. First, it is not clear that breaking up 
and regulating big tech would prevent those firms from having the con-
siderable resources to develop the technologies of the future. Facebook 
would still have billions of users, even without Instagram and WhatsApp, 
for example. Amazon’s platform would still have enormous market power. 
Second, and more importantly, part of the answer is that the deci-
sion to break up and regulate tech companies should be accompanied by 
public investment in R&D. One of the primary arguments for the national 
champions view is that monopolists have the resources to be able to 
invest in innovation because they do not face competitive pressures.65 
But any system of innovation operates against a backdrop of laws and 
public policy.66 The ability to capture the gains of innovation depends 
on intellectual property law. The possibility of winning government 
contracts for frontier projects that require innovation is determined by 
procurement policies. And, of course, an alternative to monopolist invest-
ment in R&D is public investment in R&D. These policy choices all shape 
the innovation ecosystem, and it is not at all obvious why society has 
to accept national champions instead of thinking about revising these 
laws and policies more broadly. Given the emphasis that proponents of 
national champions place on research and development, it is worth not-
ing that historically, as Mariana Mazzucato has argued, government has 
been a significant driver of innovation through its research and develop-
ment efforts.67 Today, one could easily imagine the government spending 
considerable sums of money on R&D in artificial intelligence, robotics, 
quantum computing, augmented and virtual reality, and other technolog-
ical research. 
Public investment in research has a variety of benefits. First, because 
it is not tied to the profit motive and business model of a single company, 
it covers a wider range of subjects, leading potentially to innovations that 
would otherwise go undiscovered. Public investment extends to basic 
research that does not have immediate or foreseeable commercial appli-
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cations. It could also include research into areas that might challenge the 
incumbency and business models of existing companies. 
Second, and relatedly, public investment into research is less 
likely to be geared toward improving surveillance capacity. As long as 
the biggest companies have surveillance, personalized targeting, and 
behavioral response at the heart of their business models, research and 
innovation within those companies will likely be geared, in no trivial part, 
toward improving those activities. A digital authoritarian country might 
see that as a valuable public goal, but it is not at all clear why a free and 
democratic society should. Public-sponsored research might instead be 
directed toward a variety of socially beneficial uses other than continual 
improvement of individual monitoring and behavioral reactions. Nota-
bly, as there are more opportunities in research outside of the big tech 
companies, many talented people might choose to work on a wider range 
of problems.
Third, public investment in R&D has the potential to spread the bene-
fits of technology, innovation, and industry throughout the country. At 
present, much of the country’s technological and intellectual prowess is 
concentrated in a few regions, the most prominent being northern Cali-
fornia, Seattle, and Boston. Geographic inequality has a variety of nega-
tive consequences—economic, social, and political.68 But, as economists 
Jonathan Gruber and Simon Johnson show in their book Jump-Starting 
America, there is no reason that public investment couldn’t spur suc-
cessful economies in dozens of mid-sized cities all over the country, with 
spillover benefits for their regions.69 Unlike government action, technol-
ogy companies have no reason to develop the capacities of all regions of 
the country. Amazon’s so-called competition for its second headquarters 
is a good example. After much public attention, the company settled on 
New York City and a suburb of Washington, D.C., two superstar cities. 
Artificial intelligence, of course, requires considerable data in order 
to improve precision and accuracy. One of the arguments for big tech is 
that such companies alone are able to collect this data and use it. But 
there is no reason why this has to be the case either. Consider two alter-
nate possibilities. First, the United States could create a public data com-
mons that would be highly regulated to protect privacy. The public data 
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commons would include publicly available data from a variety of govern-
ment sources, and qualifying businesses, local governments, or nonprof-
its could train their machines using this data. Any new data they collect 
from users could then be fed back into the data commons (de-identified), 
so that the data commons improves in quality and quantity of data over 
time.70 Second, we could imagine requiring big tech companies to make 
their data available in interoperable formats. If these companies effec-
tively have a monopoly power over data, then they could be regulated as 
monopolies—and one condition of their continued protection as monop-
olies could be enabling access to the datasets. Again, there is no legal or 
regulatory reason why these kinds of policy options are impossible. And 
in either case, they would enable a larger number of players to innovate 
than does the status-quo, stand-pat approach to protecting big tech from 
competition.
Big Tech and the Defense Industrial Base
Concentration in the tech sector also threatens the defense industrial 
base due to higher costs, lower quality, less innovation, and even 
corruption and fraud.71 Each of these dynamics has already been a 
problem for America’s over-consolidated defense industrial base. As 
technology becomes more and more central to defense and national 
security, it is likely that these same dynamics will replicate themselves 
with big tech companies. This will become a national security threat, 
both directly, in terms of the quality and speed of procurement, and 
indirectly, by reducing innovation and functionally redirecting defense 
budgets from research spending to higher monopoly profits.72
Conventional economic theory suggests that monopolists have the 
ability to increase prices and reduce quality because consumers are 
captive.73 When it comes to defense spending, the Government Account-
ability Office commented in 2019 that “competition is the cornerstone of a 
sound acquisition process and a critical tool for achieving the best return 
on investment for taxpayers.”74 At the same time, the GAO observed that 
“portfolio-wide cost growth has occurred in an environment where awards 
are often made without full and open competition.”75 Indeed, it found 
that 67 percent of 183 major weapons systems contracts had no compe-
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tition and almost half of contracts went to a handful of firms. Of course, 
consolidation also means that the Defense Department is in a symbiotic 
relationship with these big contractors. Some startup executives wanting 
to sell to the government thus see the Pentagon as “a bad customer, one 
that is heavily skewed in favor of larger, traditional players,” and they 
don’t feel like they can break into the sector.76
Standard stories about political economy and capture also suggest 
that these firms will have outsized power over government.77 As Frank 
Kendall, the former head of acquisitions at the Pentagon, has said, “With 
size comes power, and the department’s experience with large defense 
contractors is that they are not hesitant to use this power for corporate 
advantage.”78 In the defense context, that means monopolists retain 
power (and profits), even if they overcharge taxpayers and risk the safety 
of military personnel in the field. 
In an important article in The American Conservative on concentra-
tion in the defense sector, researchers Matt Stoller and Lucas Kunce argue 
that contractors with de facto monopoly at the heart of their business 
models threaten national security. They write that one such contractor, 
TransDigm, buys up companies that supply the government with rare but 
essential airline parts and then hike up the prices, effectively holding the 
government “hostage.”79  They also point to L3, a defense contractor that 
had ambitions to be a “Home Depot” for the Pentagon, as its former CEO 
put it. L3’s de facto monopoly over certain products, according to Stoller 
and Kunce, means that it continues to receive lucrative government con-
tracts, even after admitting in 2015 that it knowingly supplied defective 
weapons sights to U.S. forces.80 
Consolidation also threatens U.S. defense capacity. The decline of 
competition, according to a 2019 Pentagon report, leaves the military 
vulnerable to “sole source suppliers, capacity shortfalls, a lack of compe-
tition, a lack of workforce skills, and unstable demand.”81 With a limited 
number of producers, there is less talent and knowhow available in the 
country if there is a need to build capacity rapidly.82 In 2018, the Defense 
Department released a report on vulnerable items in the military supply 
chain, including numerous items in which only one or two domestic 
companies (and, in some cases, zero domestic companies) produced the 
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essential goods.83 
How did the United States lose so much of its industrial base? 
The combination of consolidation and global integration is part of the 
story. As Stoller and Kunce argue, companies consolidated in the 1980s 
and 1990s while shifting emphasis from production and R&D to Wall 
Street-demanded profits. Globalization then allowed them to shift pro-
duction overseas at a lower cost. The result was to gut America’s domestic 
industrial base—and, in many cases, to shift it to China, which engaged 
in a decades-long strategic plan to develop its own industrial base. The 
result, in the words of the 2018 Defense Department report, is that “China 
is the single or sole supplier for a number of specialty chemicals used in 
munitions and missiles.” In other areas too, the risks of losing access to 
critical resources are real. Describing the problem of limited carbon fiber 
sources, the same Pentagon report notes, “[a] sudden and catastrophic 
loss of supply would disrupt DoD missile, satellite, space launch, and 
other defense manufacturing programs. In many cases, there are no sub-
stitutes readily available.”84
As technology becomes more integral to the future of national 
security, it is hard to see how big tech will not simply go the way of the 
big defense contractors. Corporate mottos not to “be evil” are long gone,85 
and big tech companies spend millions on conventional Washington, 
D.C., lobbying efforts.86 Over time, as contracts move to tech behemoths, 
there will no longer be competitive alternatives, and the Pentagon will 
likely be locked into relationships with big tech companies—just as they 
currently are with big defense contractors.87 Some commentators suggest 
that robust antitrust policies are a problem because only a small num-
ber of tech companies can contract for defense projects.88 But there is 
another way to look at it: The goal should be to encourage competition in 
the tech sector so that there are multiple contractors available. As former 
secretary of homeland security Michael Chertoff has said, defending the 
antitrust case against Qualcomm, “a single-source national champion 
creates an unacceptable risk to American security—artificially concentrat-
ing vulnerability in a single point. ... We need competition and multiple 
providers, not a potentially vulnerable technological monoculture.”89
The consequence of consolidation in tech is that taxpayers will likely 
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see higher bills even as innovation slows due to reduced competition. 
Worse still, every taxpayer dollar that goes to monopoly profits—whether 
in the form of higher prices or fraud and corruption—is a dollar that is 
not going toward innovation for the future. A concentrated defense sector 
means not only less innovation due to the lack of competition in the 
sector; it means that funding that could have been available for innova-
tion instead gets redirected via monopoly profits to the pockets of big tech 
executives and shareholders.
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CONCLUSION
It is perfectly understandable why big tech companies don’t want to be broken up or regulated. They are profitable, growing, and powerful. It is also perfectly understandable why they deploy 
national security arguments to defend against the prospect. National 
security arguments have long been a trump card in law, policy, and poli-
tics, forming an exception to the normal rules that govern the economy.90 
But if we take seriously national security imperatives in a time of 
great power competition, the case for shielding big tech from competi-
tion is surprisingly weak. Tech companies are not competing with China 
so much as integrating with China, and their integration comes with 
threats to the United States. The best route to broad and transformative 
innovation is competition coupled with public spending on R&D—not 
concentration into monopolies. Rather than threatening national security, 
breaking up big tech will help bolster it.  
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